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INTRODUCTION'

Then as now, Philadelphia summers were notorious for their heat and
humidity. By 1787, the colonial capital originally laid out by William Penn
over a century earlier had blossomed into the nation's largest city and one of
its busiest ports. Although progressive by standards of the day with broad
leafy streets and handsome brick buildings, the city lacked modem sanitation
facilities and epidemics were a reoccurring threat. A stench often hung over
the place during the dog days of July and August. No wonder many
sophisticated Americans of that era preferred country life over city dwelling,
especially in summer.
During the summer of 1787, Philadelphians had some highly
distinguished visitors to share their misery: fifty-five delegates to a
convention meeting in the Philadelphia State House, where the Declaration
of Independence had been signed. The Convention was called to revise the
terms of the federal union for the United States. Those delegates comprised

.
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an impressive group of political leaders and nation builders. Thirty-nine had
already served in Congress, while seven had been state governors. Eight had
signed the Declaration of Independence, and fifteen had helped to draft the
innovative constitutions of the states. Over half were college graduates, and
over three-fifths had trained as lawyers. The delegates came from as far
away as Georgia and New Hampshire. They included plantation owners,
farmers, and merchants; nineteen of them owned slaves. Their average age
was forty-two years. The youngest delegate was only twenty-six years old,
while the oldest was the legendary Benjamin Franklin, perhaps the most
famous of all Americans, eighty-one and in failing health.
The Convention was supposed to have started on May 14, but none but
the most eager and well prepared delegates had arrived by that time. One
who had was James Madison, a thirty-six-year-old delegate from Virginia
and ardent student of political history and theory. He had played a large role
in bringing the Convention about. Like all of the delegates who would
eventually show up, Madison was in Philadelphia because he believed that
the United States had a government woefully inadequate to address the grave
dangers that it faced.
Following their declaration of independence from Britain in 1776, the
thirteen states had formed a "firm league" 2 of "perpetual [u]nion" 3 under the
Articles of Confederation. However, it was a union in which, as the Articles
guaranteed, each state kept its own "sovereignty, freedom, and
independence."4 The document took effect in 1781, after the thirteenth state
finally ratified it. Under the Articles, the United States government was
little more than a planning and execution board of foreign policy for a
federation of thirteen otherwise independent republics. Congress could
make treaties and declare war; and it was nominally in charge of the
Northwest Territory, stretching from present-day Ohio to Minnesota, but
which was in fact controlled by Indians. It could not impose taxes, tariffs, or
other revenue devices, nor could it maintain an army of its own. This
arrangement initially made perfect sense to the states. When they ratified
the Articles, they were in the process of collectively fighting for their
independence from an oppressive, powerful monarchy, and their leaders had
no desire to place themselves under another overbearing government.
However, it quickly became evident to nearly everyone that the Articles of
Confederation were an inadequate vehicle for guiding the fast-growing
United States and its over three million people through a treacherous world.
Foreign countries slapped restrictions on American shipping and the United
States could not retaliate. Spain encroached on territory in the American
South, while Britain continued to occupy forts in the old Northwest. Some
desperate settlers in the rapidly expanding trans-Appalachian West hinted at
forming their own states outside the union or joining Spain. Although the
Articles left the national interest of the United States heavily dependent on

2.

ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art.

3. Id. at pmbl.
4. Id.at art. II.

Ill.
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state goodwill, the states conducted themselves by narrow standards of selfinterest. They regularly ignored federal treaties, including provisions of the
peace treaty with Britain, and built trade barriers against products from other
states.
Struggling to pay off huge war-bond obligations, the states
increasingly ignored the Confederation's urgent pleas for money.
Almost as soon as the new government was formed, it became widely
acknowledged that the Confederation Congress needed at least the ability to
raise money and regulate commerce in some form. The states, however,
fiercely jealous of their independence, had written into the Articles that any
changes to them required the agreement of all thirteen states. Even so
necessary a revenue measure as a retaliatory impost on imported goods
floundered on the refusal of a single state, Rhode Island, to go along. The
Articles did not work, and they provided no viable method for selfadjustment. That year, the Confederation Congress endorsed a call, initiated
by Alexander Hamilton, for the states to send delegates to Philadelphia in
1787 to devise revisions for the Articles.
Among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, there was a
consensus that the United States government could not function or even
survive simply on the goodwill of the states. But Madison, as he considered
the disarray of the America union and what was needed to remedy it,
reached a far more sweeping conclusion. The problem was not just that
selfish states threatened the survival of the confederation. As he saw it,
these states threatened the very purpose of the American Revolution.
Internally, the states exhibited the same selfishness and pettiness they
displayed on the national scale. Madison had served in the Virginia
legislature through much of the 1780s, and what he found there were not
selfless patriots, but narrow-minded politicians, concerned mainly with log
rolling, deal making, and satisfying their local constituencies. Madison's
plans to reform the state court system got nowhere, and his effort to reduce
British control of the state's shipping was gutted by local special interests.
As he contemplated the upcoming Constitutional Convention during the
winter of 1786-87, Madison concluded that the United States, in order to
survive, needed to be more than a federation of states, with a "federal"
government (as it was then called), but a true nation, with a national
government that could break the power of the states and issue laws that
directly bound all American citizens. The diversity of local interests would
be submerged in such a large government, Madison believed, and petty local
tyrants would be too obscure to get elected. Instead, he hoped that national
lawmakers would unite around a broad understanding of the common good,
which included the protection of the rights of property.
While Madison waited for enough delegates to show up in Philadelphia
to make a quorum, with the aid of other Virginia delegates, he solidified his
ideas on the ideal republican government into fifteen succinct resolutions.
Together, these resolutions became known as the Virginia Plan.

By May 25, 1787, enough state delegations had arrived in Philadelphia
to begin the Convention. Four days later, the governor of Virginia, Edmund
Randolph, formally introduced the Virginia Plan as a starting point for the
Convention's deliberations. It was a bold stroke - a complete break from
the Articles of Confederation by a Convention charged merely with
proposing amendments to that document. The delegates listening to him
were men of the world, and they knew the United States needed to be able to
defend itself and its interests. They were also men of property, and they
knew that they would benefit from a government capable of spurring the
country's economic growth and honoring its financial obligations.
Moreover, they feared the swelling tides of popular hostility to their class
that had penetrated the elected legislatures of many states. Finally, they
were patriots; one third of them had served in the Revolutionary Army.
They wished to preserve liberty and a republican government from the
manifold threats they perceived to it, both from within and without.
Yet the delegates were also riven with mutual suspicions, conflicting
economic interests, fierce state loyalties, and fears that the Virginia Plan
would unleash a monster that could destroy the very liberty it was intended
to preserve. Madison understood that if the Convention finally approved a
constitution with any resemblance to his fifteen resolutions, it could mark
the beginning of an extraordinary, unprecedented experiment in large-scale
republican government. Inspired by a keen sense of history-in-the-making,
he decided to keep detailed notes of the entire proceedings.
Thanks to Madison's genius, we not only have the finest Constitution
ever devised by mortals, but we also have a record of how those very mortal
delegates in Philadelphia succeeded against all odds in drafting that
document. In the time that I have left, permit me to share with you some of
what Madison's notes tells us about the deliberations at the Convention
regarding the national preemption of state laws. As you probably know, the
deliberations that summer in Philadelphia were as hot as the weather - and
they threatened to break down altogether over slavery, presidential power,
and the structure of the legislative branch. Fixing the proper balance
between state and national authority certainly stood out as one of the
delegates' major concerns, and is well worth our time as we consider the
thorny issue of preemption at this symposium.
II.

5
FROM MADISON'S NOTES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

On May 29, the aristocratic, thirty-five-year-old governor of Virginia,
Edmund Randolph, took the floor to attack the Articles of Confederation and
introduce the Virginia Plan for a new and truly national government.6

5. In this section, everything in block quotations is taken from delegates' notes of the
Constitutional Convention as arranged and edited in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). Page citations for each excerpt are in specific footnotes.
6. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note I (manuscript at 14, on file with authors).
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The government would consist of a national legislature, judiciary, and
executive - each with the ability to check each other's power.7 The
legislature would have two houses, with the larger one (the future House of
Representatives) elected by the people and a smaller one (the future Senate)
elected by the larger one. 8 The national legislature could veto state laws it
deemed to violate the national Constitution, and it would choose the chief
executive, who could veto the legislature's laws with the aid of a Council of
Revision drawn from the judiciary. 9 In a nutshell, this was Madison's
scheme.
Mr. [Edmund] Randolph....
1. The character of such a govemme[nt] ought to secure 1. against
foreign invasion: 2. against dissensions between members of the
Union, or seditions in particular states: 3. to p[ro]cure to the several
States various blessings, of which an isolated situation was
i[n]capable: 4. to be able to defend itself against [e]ncroachment
[from the states]: [and] 5. to be paramount to the state constitutions.
2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he .... proceeded
to enumerate [five] defects: ....

4. that the fje]deral government could not defend itself against the
[e]ncroachments from the states:
5. that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions .... 10
On June 4, the delegates had agreed on the proposition that there should
be a national judiciary with a single supreme court. 1' In changing the
language of the Virginia Plan from "one or more supreme tribunals, and of
inferior tribunals," to "one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior
tribunals," they had too rashly (for some) agreed to having lower national
courts in addition to a supreme court.' 2 A supreme court was needed for
uniform national laws, all agreed, but many delegates disagreed with the

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
James Madison, Convention Notes (May 29), in I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 18-19 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937).
11. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note I (manuscript at 25).
12. Id.

Virginia Plan's proposition that the national legislature should choose the
judges, and some delegates feared that lower national courts intruded on the
state judiciaries.13 That issue took center stage on Tuesday, June 5.
"that the national Judiciary be <chosen> by the
<The Clause> 14
National Legislature", <being under consideration.>
Mr. [James] Wilson opposed the appointment <of Judges by the>
national Legisl[ature]: Experience sh[o]wed the impropriety of such
appointm[en]ts[] by numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and
concealment were the necessary consequences. A principal reason
for unity in the Executive was that officers might be appointed by a
single, responsible person.
Mr. [John] Rutlidge was by no means disposed to grant so great a
power to any single person. The people will think we are leaning
too much towards Monarchy. He was against establishing any
national tribunal except a single supreme one. The State Tribunals
<are most proper> to decide in all cases in the first instance. 15
Mr. [James] Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the
Legislature or any numerous body. Besides, the danger of intrigue
and partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite
qualifications. The Legislative talents which were very different
from those of a Judge, commonly recommended men to the favor of
Legislative Assemblies. It was known too that the accidental
circumstances of presence and absence, of being a member or not a
member, had a very undue influence on the appointment. On the
other hand [h]e was not satisfied with referring the appointment to
the Executive. He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch,
as numerous eno[ugh] to be confided in - as not so numerous as to
be governed by the motives of the other branch; and as being
sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate
judgments. He hinted this only and moved that the appointment by
to be hereafter
the Legislaturemight be struck out, [and] a blank left
16
filled on maturer reflection. Mr. Wilson seconds it.

13. Id.
14. The < > marks indicate where Madison made changes to his own notes, apparently after the
Journal of the Federal Convention of 1787 was published in 1819. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at xv-xix.
15. James Madison, Convention Notes (June 5), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at 119 (footnotes omitted).
16. Id. at 120 (footnotes omitted).
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On the question for striking out, MA, NY, NJ, PA, DL, MD, VA,
NC, GA, aye 9; CT, SC, no 2. "
Mr. Rutlidge hav[in]g obtained a rule for reconsideration of the
clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national
authority, now moved that that part of the clause <in propos[ition]
[nine]> should be expunged: arguing that the State Tribunals might
and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the
right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to
secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgm[en]ts: that it was
making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction <of the
States,> and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the
new system. - <Mr. [Roger] Sherman [second]ded the motion.>
Mr. <Madison> observed that unless inferior tribunals were
dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many
cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that
besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was
to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under
the biased directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of
an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would
answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the supreme bar would
oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, tho[ugh] ever so
distant from the seat of the Court. An effective Judiciary
establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was
essential. A Government without a proper Executive [and]
Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body without arms or legs to
act or move. 18
Mr. [John] Dickinson. The preservation of the States in a certain
degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision
between the different authorities which should be wished for in
order to check each other. To attempt to abolish the States
altogether, would degrade the Councils of our Country, would be
impracticable, would be ruinous. He compared the proposed
National System to the Solar System, in which the States were the
planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits. 19

17. Id.
18. Id. at 124.
19. James Madison, Convention Notes (June 7), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at 152-53 (footnote omitted).

Col. [George] Mason. [W]hatever power may be necessary for the
Nat[iona]l Gov[ernmen]t a certain portion must necessarily be left
in the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme
parts of the U. S. [sic] so as to carry equal justice to them. The
State Legislatures also ought to have some means of defending
themselves
ag[ain]st
encroachments
of the Nat[iona]l
Gov[ernmen]t. In every other department we have studiously
endeavored to provide for its self-defense. Shall we leave the States
alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better
means can we provide than the giving them some share in, or rather
to make them a constituent part of, the Nat[iona]l
Establishment[?] 0
On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the
State-Legislatures. 2
MA, CT, NY, PA, DL, MD, VA, NC, SC, GA, aye

10.22

On Friday, June 8, the delegates debated whether the national legislature
should have the power to veto state laws.23 Madison strongly supported the
proposal, but this effort to radically curtail the power of the states was
decisively rejected, just as his effort to prevent the state legislatures from
electing senators was defeated the day before.24
As debate on Governor Randoph's Virginia Plan for a strong national
government continued, some delegates (particularly those from smaller
states) began to worry that the emerging document was giving too much
power to the central government at the expense of the states. On Friday,
June 15, William Patterson of New Jersey, acting on behalf of his state's
delegation and with the support of other delegates, introduced an alternative
plan that would strengthen the confederation while retaining significant
power in the state.25 His plan became know as the New Jersey Plan. Debate
on the two plans began in earnest on June 16.26 That debate reveals the
extent of national power assumed under the Virginia Plan, which ultimately
prevailed over the New Jersey Plan as the basis for the Constitution.
Mr. [Stephen] Lansing called for the reading of the [first] resolution
of each plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in
contrast; that of Mr. Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.at155-56.
Id. at 156.
Id.
LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31).
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 36).
Id.
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the respective States, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it: the latter
requires a negative on all the laws of the particular States; the
former, only certain general powers for the general good. The plan
of Mr. R[andolph] in short absorbs all power except what may be
exercised in the little local matters of the States which are not
objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He grounded his
preference of Mr. P[atterson]'s plan, chiefly on two objections
1. want of power in the
ag[ain]st that of Mr. R[andolph]
Convention to discuss [and] propose it. 2[.] the improbability of its
being adopted.27

Although the convention voted to proceed with framing a constitution
using the Virginia Plan as its basis, the delegates repeatedly returned to the
issue of the status of the states within the proposed constitutional union.
Some of their comments follow.
Mr. [Alexander] Hamilton .... But as States are a collection of
individual men which ought we to respect most, the rights of the
people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the
composition[?] Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than
to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been s[ai]d that if the
smaller States renounce their equality, they renounce at the same
time their liberty. The truth is it is a contest for power, not for
liberty.25

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the
establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He
would add another of a most serious nature. Alliances will
immediately be formed with different rival [and] hostile nations of
Europe[], who will foment disturbances among ourselves and make
us parties to all their own quarrels. Foreign nations having
American dominions are [and] must be jealous of us. Their
representatives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate, [and] for the
result of this meeting, which must have an essential influence on
it.- It had been said that respectability in the eyes of foreign
Nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper
object of republican Government was domestic tranquillity [and]
happiness. This was an ideal distinction. No Govemm[en]t could

27. James Madison, Convention Notes (June 16), in I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supranote 10, at 249.
28. James Madison, Convention Notes (June 29), in I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at 465-66.

give us tranquillity [and] happiness at home, which did not possess
sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad. This
was the critical moment for forming such a government.29
Mr. [William] Pierce. The great difficulty in [the Confederation]
congress arose from the mode of voting. Members spoke on the
floor as state advocates, and were bias[]ed by local advantages.What is federal? No more than a compact between states; and the
one heretofore formed is insufficient. We are now met to remedy
its defects, and our difficulties are great, but not, I hope,
insurmountable. State distinctions must be sacrificed so far as the
general government shall render it necessary-without, however,
destroying them altogether. Although I am here as a representative
from a small state, I consider myself as a citizen of the United
States, whose general interest I will always support.3 °
Mr. [Elbridge] Gerry, urged that we never were independent States,
were not such now, [and] never could be even on the principles of
the Confederation. The States [and] the advocates for them were
intoxicated with the idea of their sovereignty. He was a member of
[the Continental] Congress at the time the federal articles were
formed. The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote was long
insisted on. He voted for it, but it was ag[ain]st his Judgment, and
under the pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser
States. The present confederation he considered as dissolving. The
fate of the Union will be decided by the Convention. If they do not
agree on something, few delegates will probably be appointed to
[the Confederation] Cong[res]s. If they do Cong[res]s will probably
be kept up till the new System should be adopted - He lamented
that instead of coming here like a band of brothers, belonging to the
same family, we seemed to have brought with us the spirit of
political nego[t]iators. 3
On Tuesday, July 17, the Convention gave Congress broad discretionary
legislative powers, but Madison's proposal that it have the power to review
and veto state laws went down again in crashing defeat, with only three
states (MA, VA, and NC) voting for it.32 In its place, Luther Martin
proposed what would eventually become the Constitution's supremacy

29. Id. at 466-67.
30. Robert Yates, Convention Notes (June 29), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at 474.
31. James Madison, Convention Notes (June 29), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at 467.
32. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note I (manuscript at 70).
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clause.33 Martin's resolution, taken from the New Jersey Plan, affirmed that
all laws and treaties passed by Congress would be the "supreme law of the
respective states" and that state courts were obliged to follow them in their
rulings, regardless of state laws.34

It passed without any dissent.35

Meanwhile, on July 18, the delegates moved on to the issue of inferior
national courts.36

Although this issue had proved contentious earlier and

divisions over it remained, the Convention quickly accepted the compromise
fashioned by the Committee of the Whole to authorize (rather than mandate)
the creation of such courts.37

12. Resol[ution]: "that Nat[iona]l <Legislature> be empowered to
appoint inferior tribunals[.]"
Mr. [Pierce] Butler could see no necessity for such tribunals. The
State Tribunals might do the business.
Mr. [Luther] Martin concurred. They will create jealousies [and]
oppositions in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they
will interfere.
Mr. [Nathanial] Ghorum....

Inferior tribunals are essential to

render the authority of the Nat[iona]l Legislature effectual[.]
Mr. Randolph observed that the Courts of the States can not be
trusted with the administration of the National laws. The objects of
jurisdiction are such as will often place the General [and] local
policy at variance.
Mr. G[ouverneur] Morris urged also the necessity of such a
provision.
Mr. Sherman was willing to give the power to the Legislature but
wished them to make use of the State Tribunals whenever it could
be done[] with safety to the general interest.

33. Id.
34. Id.; James Madison, Convention Notes (July 17), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 28-29 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937).
35. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note 1 (manuscript at 70); James Madison, Convention Notes
(July 17), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 34, at 29.

36. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note I (manuscript at 73).
37. Id.

Col. Mason thought many circumstances might arise not now to be
foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary.
On question for agreeing to 12. Resol[ution]: <empowering the
National Legislature
to appoint> "inferior tribunals[.]" Ag[ree]d to
38
nem. con.
After working though the Virginia Plan, the Convention sent the various
resolutions as amended to a Committee of Detail, which fashioned those
resolutions into twenty-three articles. 39 The Convention then worked
through these articles. On August 23 it came to Article VIII: a supremacy
clause based on the one approved by the Convention on July 17.40 The
Committee of Detail strengthened this clause slightly. 41 Where Martin's
version followed the New Jersey Plan by instructing state judges that
Congressional acts were "the supreme law of the several states" and
preempted state laws, the new version stated that acts passed by Congress
also preempted state constitutions.4 2 John Rutlidge proposed adding "This
Constitution" to the beginning of the article, making it clear that the
Constitution itself (as well as Congressional acts) preempted state laws and
constitutions, and that state judges were bound to comply. 43 Rutlidge's
motion was approved. 44 When this clause reached the final draft of the
45
Constitution as Article VI, Section 2, "supreme law of the several states"
46
became the "supreme [flaw of the [1]and, ''47
to underscore that the United
confederacy.
a
not
nation,
States was now a
On their last working day (Saturday, September 15) the delegates made
a variety of corrections and changes to the Constitution. 48 Incorporating
provisions approved by the Convention, the Constitution gave Congress the
power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises," and "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations. 49 It specifically barred states from

38. James Madison, Convention Notes (July 18), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 34, at 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
39. LARSON & WINSHIP, supra note 1 (manuscript at 81).

40. Id. (manuscript at 101).
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.; James Madison, Convention Notes (Aug. 23), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 34, at 389.
44. James Madison, Convention Notes (Aug. 23), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 34, at 389.
45. Id.
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
47. LARSON &WINSHIP, supra note 1 (manuscript at 101).
48. Id. (manuscript at 113).
49. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.1.
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laying duties on imports or exports without Congressional consent. 50 A
proposal to qualify this restriction led to a brief exchange between
Gouverneur Morris and James Madison on the negative reach of
Congressional power to regulate commerce. 5' The extent of that power
would become a significant and much litigated issue in American
constitutional law.52
Mr. [William] Mc.Henry [and] Mr. [John] Carroll moved that "no
State shall be restrained from laying duties of tonnage for the
purpose of clearing [harbors] and erecting light-houses[.]"
Col. Mason in support of this explained and urged the situation of
the Chesapeak which peculiarly required [expenses] of this sort.
Mr. Govr. Morris. The States are not restrained from laying
tonnage as the Constitution now [s]tands. The exception proposed
will imply the [c]ontrary, and will put the States in a worse
condition than the gentleman (Col[.] Mason) wishes.
Mr. Madison. Whether the States are now restrained from laying
tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power "to regulate
commerce[.]" These terms are vague but seem to exclude this
power of the States- They may certainly be restrained by Treaty.
He observed that there were other objects for tonnage Duties as the
support of Seamen &c. He was more [and] more convinced that the
regulation of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and ought to
be wholly under one authority.
Mr. Sherman. The power of the U[nited] States to regulate trade
being supreme can [control] interferences of the State regulations
<when> such interferences happen; so that there is no danger to be
apprehended from a concurrent jurisdiction.

50. LARSON & WINSHIP, supranote 1 (manuscript at 113).

51. Id.
52. Id.

Mr. [Stephen] Langdon insisted that the regulation of tonnage was
an essential part of the regulation of trade, and that the States ought
shall lay
to have nothing to do with it. On motion "that no [']State
53
any duty on tonnage without the Consent['] of Congress."
NH, MA,4 NJ, DL, MD, SC, aye 6; PA, VA, NC, GA, no 4; CT
divided.
As the Convention moved toward adopting the Constitution, several
delegates led by Governor Edmund Randolph, who had originally offered
the Virginia Plan, rose to state their objections to the document. Several of
those objections speak to the broad powers envisioned for the new national
government over the states.
Mr. Randolph animadverting on the indefinite and dangerous power
given by the Constitution to Congress, expressing the pain he felt at
differing from the body of the Convention, on the close of the great [and]
awful subject of their [labors], and anxiously wishing for some
accommodating expedient which would relieve him from his
embarrassments, made a motion importing "that amendments to the plan
might be offered by the State Conventions, which should be submitted to
and finally decided on by another general Convention." Should this
proposition be disregarded, it would he said be impossible for him to put his
name to the instrument. Whether he should oppose it afterwards he would
not then decide but he would not deprive himself of the freedom to do so in
his own State, if that course should be prescribed by his final judgment Col: Mason [second]ded [and] followed Mr. Randolph in
animadversions on the dangerous power and structure of the
Government, concluding that it would end either in monarchy, or a
tyrannical aristocracy; which, he was in doubt[,] but one or other, he
was sure.
This Constitution had been formed without the
knowledge or idea of the people. A second Convention will know
more of the sense of the people, and be able to provide a system
more consonant to it. It was improper to say to the people, take this
or nothing. As the Constitution now stands, he could neither give it
his support or vote in Virginia; and he could not sign here what he
could not support there. With the expedient of another Convention
as proposed, he could sign.
Mr. [Charles] Pinkney. These declarations from members so
respectable at the close of this important scene, give a peculiar
He descanted on the
solemnity to the present moment.
consequences of calling forth the deliberations [and] amendments of

53. James Madison, Convention Notes (Sept. 15), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 34, at 625 (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 625-26.
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the different States on the subject of Government at large. Nothing
but confusion [and] contrariety could spring from the experiment.
The States will never agree in their plans-And the Deputies to a
second Convention coming together under the discordant
impressions of their Constituents, will never agree. Conventions are
serious things, and ought not to be repeated- He was not without
objections as well as others to the plan. He objected to the
contemptible weakness [and] dependence of the Executive. He
objected to the power of a majority only of Cong[res]s over
Commerce. But apprehending the danger of a general confusion,
and an ultimate decision by the Sword, he should give the plan his
support.
Mr. Gerry, stated the objections which determined him to withhold
his name from the Constitution. 1. the duration and re-eligibility of
the Senate. 2. the power of the House of Representatives to conceal
their journals. 3[.]- the power of Congress over the places of
election. 4[.] the unlimited power of Congress over their own
compensations.
5[.] Massachusetts has not a due share of
Representatives allotted to her. 6. 3/5 of the Blacks are to be
represented as if they were freemen[.] 7. Under the power over
commerce, monopolies may be established. 8. The vice president
being made head of the Senate. He could however he said get over
all these, if the rights of the Citizens were not rendered insecure[.]
1. by the general power of the Legislature to make what laws they
may please to call necessary and proper. 2. raise armies and money
without limit. 3. to establish a tribunal without juries, which will be
a Star-chamber as to Civil cases. Under such a view of the
Constitution, the best that could be done he conceived was to
provide for a second general Convention.
On the question on the proposition of Mr. Randolph. All the States
answered- no.
On the question to agree to the Constitution[] as amended. All the
States ay.
The Constitution was then ordered to be engrossed.

55
And the House adjourned.

III. CONCLUSION
The framers' words at the Constitutional Convention have never
controlled the subsequent interpretation of the Constitution, nor should
they. 6 The delegates voted to keep their deliberations secret at the time.57
No official transcript of the debates exists.58 Madison kept his own notes
private until his death in 1836, the last of the delegates to die.5 9 These notes
summarize what the delegates said behind the closed doors of the
Pennsylvania State House during the summer of 1787, but probably contain
less than ten percent of their words. 60 Although scholars view Madison's
61
notes as highly accurate, they do not provide a perfect record of the event.
Further, even if a complete transcript existed, the Constitution gained legal
significance by being ratified, not by being drafted, which suggests that
ratifiers' intentions should outweigh those of the framers in Constitutional
interpretation, especially because the ratifiers did not have access to a record
of the Convention debates.62
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Convention brought together a
remarkable assemblage of delegates to frame the document that became the
fundamental law of the United States. Although their intentions for the
nation varied greatly even among such critical participants as James

Madison, Gouvemeur Morris, James Wilson, and Roger Sherman, the clear
majority of delegates shared a vision for a strong national government that
held the power
conclusion of
negative reach
restrained from

to oversee the country's commerce. For example, near the
the deliberations, Madison asserted with respect to the
of the commerce clause, "Whether the States are now
laying tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power 'to

55. Id. at 631-33 (footnotes omitted).
56. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The InterpretativeForce of the Constitution's
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEORGETOWN L. REV. 1113, 1125 (2003) ("Most scholars would
(hopefully) agree that the secret drafting history of the Constitution should never trump the 'plain
meaning' of its text."). For a general discussion of the interpretive force of Madison's notes, see id.
at 1124-48, and H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 948 (1985).
57. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at xi, 15.
58. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 33 (1986).
59. Id. at 24.
60. Id. at 34.
61. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 55, at 1191-96; see also Hutson, supranote 57, at 27-35.
62. Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281,
288 (1987). Here Amar quotes James Madison's 1796 comments on the relative significance of the
ratifiers' and framers' intent as follows:
But, after all, whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who formed
our Constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in
expounding the Constitution. As the instrument came from them, it was nothing more
than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into
it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State [Ratifying] Conventions.
Id.; see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 55, at 1138-39.
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regulate commerce.' These terms are vague but seem to exclude this power
of the States. ' 63 This is preemption writ large. To this assertion, even so
vocal a proponent of states rights as Roger Sherman merely replied, "The
power of the U[nited] States to regulate trade being supreme can [control]
interferences of the State regulations <when> such interferences happen; so
that there is no danger to be apprehended from a concurrent jurisdiction. 64
This is preemption writ small, but preemption none the less.
By the end of the Convention's deliberations, the nation had grown so
strong at the expense of the states in the draft Constitution that the Virginia
Plan's original proponent, Edmund Randolph, held back from signing the
document. 65 The Constitution would create something new under the sun: A
large-scale republican government that would ultimately span the continent
and bring the states under its firm control.66 The words spoken at the
Constitutional Convention, while not conclusive on any issue of
constitutional interpretation, surely can help to frame the debate for further
discussion. They are offered here in that spirit - to help frame the debate for
the articles that follow in this symposium issue of the Pepperdine Law
Review.

63. James Madison, Convention Notes (Sept. 15), in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supranote 34, at 625.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 631.
66. The sense of the Constitution creating something new under the sun is captured in the title of
a book on the topic, FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985). This Latin phrase, translated as "Something New Under the Sun,"

appears on the Great Seal of the United States, reproduced on the back of every one-dollar bill.
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